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ARDENNES 

CROSSROADS to MALMEDY 

MALMEDY, a Background Summary

 

The route followed by Kampfgruppe Peiper, the crossroads of Baugnez where the Malmedy massacre happened, is surrounded by a circle.

Hitler's main objective for the Battle of the Bulge was for the 6th SS Panzer Army commanded by General Sepp Dietrich to break through the Allied front between Monschau and Losheimergraben, cross the Meuse River, and capture Antwerp. Kampfgruppe Peiper, named after and under the command of SS-Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper, was composed of armoured and motorised elements and was the spearhead of the left wing of the 6th SS Panzer Army. Once the infantry had breached the American lines, Peiper's role was to advance via Ligneuville, Stavelot, Trois-Ponts, and Werbomont and seize and secure the Meuse bridges around Huy. The best roads were reserved for the bulk of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.

 

Peiper was to use secondary roads, but these proved unsuitable for heavy armored vehicles, especially the Tiger II tanks attached to the Kampfgruppe. The success of the operation depended on the swift capture of the bridges over the Meuse. This required a rapid advance through US positions, circumventing any points of resistance whenever possible. Another factor Peiper had to consider was the shortage of fuel: the fuel resources of the Reich had been greatly reduced since the fall of Romania.

Hitler ordered the battle to be carried out with a brutality more common on the Eastern Front, in order to frighten the enemy.  According to one source, during the briefings before the operation, Peiper stated that no quarter was to be granted, no prisoners taken, and no pity shown towards Belgian civilians.

                                                 

SS-Sturmbannführer Joachim Peiper in 1943.   SS-Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich in 1943.

Peiper advances west. The Germans' initial position was east of the German-Belgium border and the Siegfried Line near Losheim. SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich's plan was for the Sixth Panzer to advance northwest through Losheimergraben and Bucholz Station and then drive 72 miles (116 km) through Honsfeld, Büllingen, and a group of villages named Trois-Ponts, to connect to Belgian Route Nationale N23, and cross the River Meuse.

Peiper had planned to use the Lanzerath-Losheimergraben road to advance on Losheimergraben immediately following the infantry, who were tasked with capturing the villages and towns immediately west of the International Highway. Unfortunately for the Germans, during their retreat earlier in the year they had destroyed the Losheim-Losheimergraben road-bridge over the railway, which prevented their use of this route. A rail overpass they had planned to use could not bear the weight of the German armor, and German engineers were slow to repair the Losheim-Losheimergraben road, forcing Peiper's vehicles to take the road through Lanzerath to Bucholz Station. Peiper's forces were delayed by massive traffic jams behind the front.

German military operations on the northern front, the key route for the entire Battle of the Bulge, were troubled by unexpectedly obstinate resistance from American troops. A single platoon of 18 men belonging to an American reconnaissance platoon and four US Forward Artillery Observers held up a battalion of about 500 German paratroopers in the village of Lanzerath, Belgium for almost an entire day. Peiper's entire timetable for his advance towards the River Meuse and Antwerp was seriously slowed, allowing the Americans precious hours to move in reinforcements.

The German 9th Fallschirmjäger Regiment, 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division finally flanked and captured the American platoon at dusk, when they ran low on ammunition and were planning to withdraw. Only one American, a forward artillery observer, was killed, while 14 were wounded: German casualties totalled 92. The Germans paused, believing the woods were filled with more Americans and tanks. Only when Peiper and his tanks arrived at midnight, twelve hours behind schedule, did the Germans learn the woods were empty.

 

First massacre at Büllingen. At 4:30 on December 17, more than 16 hours behind schedule, the 1st SS Panzer Division rolled out of Lanzerath and headed east for Honsfeld.  After capturing Honsfeld, Peiper left his assigned route for several kilometres to seize a small fuel depot in Büllingen, where members of his force killed several dozen American POWs.

Unknown to Peiper, he was in a position to flank the 2nd and the 99th Infantry Divisions: had his troops advanced north from Büllingen towards Elsenborn, they may have been able to flank and trap the American units. But Peiper followed orders. He was more determined to advance west and he stuck to his Rollbahn towards the Meuse River and captured Ligneuville, bypassing Mödersheid, Schoppen, Ondenval, and Thirimont.

The terrain and poor quality of the roads made his advance difficult. Eventually, at the exit of the small village of Thirimont, the spearhead was unable to take the direct road toward Ligneuville. Peiper again deviated from his planned route. Rather than turn left, the spearhead veered right and advanced towards the crossroads of Baugnez, which is equidistant from Malmedy, Ligneuville, and Waimes.

Peiper advances west. The opening forced through the American lines by Kampfgruppe Peiper was marked by murders of prisoners of war, and later of Belgian civilians. Members of his unit killed at least eight American prisoners in Ligneuville. Further massacres of POWs were reported in Stavelot, Cheneux, La Gleize, and Stoumont, on December 18, 19 and 20. Finally, on December 19, 1944, between Stavelot and Trois-Ponts, German forces tried to regain control of the bridge over the Amblève River in Stavelot, which was crucial for receiving reinforcements, fuel, and ammunition. Peiper’s men killed about 100 Belgian civilians.

American Army engineers blocked Peiper's advance in the narrow Amblève River valley by blowing up the bridges. Additional US reinforcements surrounded the Kampfgruppe in Stoumont and la Gleize. Peiper and 800 of his men eventually escaped this encirclement by marching through the nearby woods and abandoning their heavy equipment, including several Tiger II tanks.

On December 17 at Malmedy, Peiper's unit was still advancing aggressively and had hope of reaching its objective, whereas by December 21 at La Gleize, he was nearly cut off, out of fuel, and had sustained over 80% casualties. Peiper's tactical situation had deteriorated and he knew that he and his men were likely to be taken prisoner.

 

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